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I 
llULTINATIONAL cor,POU.ATIOH~ AND n:::IBNDENT UNDEPJ)E\IELOPl-lCHT 
IN l-1nm:r,A1-:::POTI.T ZCONOMIES: l 
?
Norman Girvan-
The purpose of this paper ic to cctablish a framework for the analysis of 
the anatomy of dependent underdevelopment for economics which arc structured 
around mincral-c::port industries operated by large multinational firms. In 
Hinterland
3 America, the cconor:d.cs of Venezuela, Chile, Surinam, Guyana,· Jamaica, 
Trinidad-Tobaco and the Dutch Antilles all fall into thiD catcr;ory to a greater 
t-
The minera 1-e::port induDtry in these countries provides theor lesser decree'. 
bulk, or a large part, of foreicn c::chancc receipts and Government revenue; 
the imports and Govc.:nmcnt c::pcnditu:.:e thus financed arc critical to the main­
tenance and crowth of economic activity. The persistent structural dependence 
of these countrieG remain::; a problco :for policy-mal~crs and analy::;ts alike. 
5 
The hidden and open con£ licts between their Governments and the producing 
companies civc rise to a state of virtually chronic crisis in this area of 
international economic relationD. 
Hy ba::;ic proposition is that the functioning of thcoe industl."'ics in the 
national economic::. in which they a.:e r,hysically located can be better. understood 
by an analyoio of their functioninr; in the corpol."'atc economics of which they are 
an organic pa.:t. Such problems ao thci::: dependence on fo::-cicn dcoand, prices 
and decioion-raal:inr;; the larce amount:. of profit repatriation and its reflection, 
the low share of the industry'o value uhich is 
1'r:.cturned 
116 to the national economy; 
and the lac!~ of intcc:ration of the industry with the nations l economy; arc the 
surface manifestations of the institutionalized relationships between 
~J:bsidiarics and their parent firms.·.. Analysis of the traditional national indc2:ea 
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of economic dependence, though useful, has been limited in its value by a neglect 
of the doing part of these industries. Uhcrc the effects of company policies 
arc treated, they arc introduced in c::n ad hoc, unsystematic manner, almost as if 
they arc accidental and random int::usions into the economic picture. In what 
followo I try to develop the idea tlrnt any analysis of the e:"tcrnal relationships of 
these industries should be based on an analysis of the organic relationship between tl-c 
subsidia::y and th~ parent company in contcopp:ra::-y vcrtically-inter;:rntcd r.mltinational 
firms. 
The pursuit of this idcn led to the need for the development of the notion 
of a corpo::atc economic system as a system conceptually qui tc distinct from a 
national ccononic system; althoui:;h obviou::.ly the two do ovc:i:lap in the real 
world, For e:~anple, a prope:i: undc::::.tandinr; of the behaviour of Chile Copper 
Company hus to be based on an analysis of the r;lobal corpo::ate economy of Anaconda, 
the parent coopany. This leads in turn to subject matter iJhich has traditionally 
been the c::clusivc preserve of Ilusines::; :-:conomics. It bccane clca::, to this 
writer at any rate, that the traditionally strict divorce bctlvccn "true" 
Economics and Dusincss ::conomics i::; obaolete, if ever the:.·c was a justification 
for it. To ::ccownizc this,· one ncccl only consider that the 11national II economics 
of many Hinterland countries arc the ::esulw nc::cly of the activities of the 
susbidiarics of two or three multinational firms within thci:i: national borders. 
The ideas uhich follow arc based on continuinr; empirical ::escarch on the 
corporate ccononic::; of the alur.1iniu □, pctrolcura and copper fiJ:ms which c::tract 
their raw oatcrials from Hinterland Ame:dca; and on the national economics of 
thonc countries in llintcrland Ancrica \Jhich a::c structurally dependent on the 
export of these ::aw or sc □ i-ptoccsscd □ incral producta by these co □ panics. 
Specifically, mo::;t of the idcai:; a::c based on the followin:3 companies and countries: 
the Aluminu.r.i ~oopany of Ar.i.c.:-ica, Alcan Alur:rl.nil.li:i'l Ltd, ,Standard Oil of New Jersey, 
Royal Dutch-Shell, Anaconda Hini~ ::!or:,pany, and Kcnnccot ..::op::,er Corporation; 
7
Jamaica, Trinidad-Tobago, Venezuela and c:iilc. The rnethodolor;y of the research 
is historical analyais. The ::aw material is the natural consec:uence of this: 
Annual r..eporta of the cor:ipanies, co:::porate hi.stories and articles on the companies; 
economic histories and conterJporary cconor:iic analysi:::. of the countries. It 
should be stressed that the intention '.1c:::c is to 3ivc only aomc baoic principles 
which seer:t to be ar,plicable to the ::;cnc.:al case of multinational corporations 
and mineral-c::po,:t cconor:iics. 
The nain qucotions for uhich we ace:: an an::.wc::.- arc (1) llo,;1 did these 
firms coae to dominate the oinera 1-export industric::. of llinte::land Ar:lcrica? 
(2) llow docs thi:::. pattern of econonic o::::;anization affect the clcte::r.1ination of 
the level of output in the minc,:al-c::po.:tinr; country? (3) Ilo,;1 doc::. the. pattern 
of economic orr;anization affect the level of national incor.ic, the ::ate of economic 
development and the der;rce of c:rtc::nal dependence of the □incral-e::port cconocy? 
and (l;) Hhy is it that Government :-trater;ies of ta::in3 the raincral-c::port industry 
heavily and usinr; tlle revenue to p~·ooote economic dcvclopracnt ocet ,;vi.th limited 
success? 
The analysical framework within which these 1ucstion::: can l>e profitably 
discussed unfolds itself in staccq ~~ich.ars partly chronolozical 
and partly conccptu.:11. They arc (i) c:ian::;e::. in metropolitan tcchnolo::;y and der.1and 
which created ne,;i indu:::trie::. in t:1c iietropolc:::; (ii) C:han::;es in r.1etropo,l:itan 
economic orcani~a::ion uhich ::;ave :·ise ::o the c:-.1c::cence of vc::tically-intcr;ratcd, 
oligopoli::.tic fi.: □s in these indu:::t::ie::;; (iii) The r.tultinationalization of the 
typical firrl; ,·.•: (iv) The procc:-::. of ::;::outh and development of the typical firm 
over time and (v) T'.1e -::-olc of the :::.ub:::idia:::y in the vertically intc:3::atcd firr.t. 
This pape:: ic therefore divided into t\vO parts. Part 1 diocusses the 
multinational corpo::ation and the r:1ine;:al-e~:port industry, and Pa::t 2 diocusses 
the Hinterland economy and the mine::al-e::port industry. 
I 
,., 
The Multinational Corporationu 
(i) Changes In iletropolitan Teclmolo:w and Demand 
Theemercence of petroleum, copper an<l alumin:iln as large-scale, basic 
industriec was □ar::ed by a number of cllaracteristicc common to all three 
industries. First, they all cmcrecd in tbe latte:r part of the nineteenth 
century in the liet::opoles, particularly in the United States. Before this 
time oil and copr,er industries did e::ict in n nuraber of countriec. But the 
level of production uas -::-elatively low, p::icea \vere :relatively hi3h, the individual 
producing unit i1a::: :::-elatively small and based on easily-wor::ed deposits: surface 
seepages of oil and high-grade coppe::- o::cs. 
Hhat too:: place in the i'.Ietropolec betueen 1350 and 19C·J was a technological 
revolution in production which created supplies which were not only quantitatively 
greater but r,ualitatively different. Subterranean oil ·was brought to the surface, 
refined and transpo::ted lone; distance::: by the discovery of oil uell drilling 
and the induced chanc;ec in the tec!mology of refining and trancpo-::-t Ores which 
contained co little copper that they ue::.·e once considered worthle::;c were brou3ht 
into production by change::: in the tccbnolocy of mining and refining; .t\luoinium 
metal began to be p::oduced in coru.1ercial c:;uantiticc for the first time. 
The chance::: on the supply cidc i1ere in pa-;:-t the cauce and in part the 
effect of cha~ec on the der.mnd aide, in ubich technolor;y alGo played an 
important part. In oil and aluminiur.1, it wa:::; the breal:throuchc in the technology 
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tJuu.., repectively which r;tinulated new uses andof production in the 1G50 '5 and l 
nr,""-t,, 
the search fo:r ncv raarkctn; in coppc::, the rapid g
rowth of deraand for wire 
resultinc from the eneq~cncc of the electricity in
du::::try in the lOO'J 
1 5 induced 
the drive to nine and treat low-r;rade orec on a la
rge r;eale. Subcequently, 
technical chance on both the demand and t'.1e :rnpply
 cide interacted upon one another 
Thus, the automobile :;:evolution in the early 1900swith cumub1tive effocts. 
created e::plor;ive 3ro,-1th dcmandr; for the productr; 
of all three indur;tries, and 
this induced furtbe:r technical chan3es on the nupp
ly 5ide. 
(ii) The Er.ic::~cnce of The Vertically-Intcr;ratcd. Oli
gopolir;tic Fi:..·n 
Accor.ipanyin3 thene changes ,ms a .:evolution in eco
nonic o::r;anization 
Ily tl1c early 19.JO::; the larr;c numbe:..· of sraall,which wa::; no less 5ir;nificant. 
single-sta~e, local Iirr.u:: in the pet::oleur.1 and cop
per indur;t::ie::; had been displaced 
by a ::;mall numbe:: of large, vc.:ticnlly-inte::;rated 
firm::; national in scope and 
In alunin iur:i.,monopo1y of r.1eta 1 production waswith olj_i;opolistic r.1arl:et control. 
a feature of t!1c indu::;try from the out::;et because 
of the Pitt::ibu::-r;h r..eduction 
Company 'i:; 
9 
acqui::.ition of the patent ri2)1t::., and the company 
soon Get about 
integrati~ itr;elf bac!~lJards into nm r.mterial e:~trac
tion and forwards into 
fabrication. 
It appears tb.at the encr::;ence of the integrated oli::;o
polir;tic firn ,~as an 
inherent and po::;r;ibly indi:::pensablc part of the .'.
'evolution which tool: place in 
in the level of technolocy, and in thethe ::;calc oi production and der.1and, 
Hith much norc capital comr:iittedquantity of carital utilized in production. 
to production on a r:i.uch la:.:::;er ccale, firr:w had to r.1
inimi:::e the rir;::r; of invcotment 
and as!:lure their focilitiec of :foll-cnpacity opera
tion by acquirinc their 
All ntaces of produ~tion andown ra,-1 r:iate::ial ::.upplie::; and □arl:et outlet.c.:. 
por;nibic ,-1ithin the frontier::. of corporatemar::etin2 had to.be brour;b.t a::; fa::- a::; 
control. Tho5c fi;:r.1::; l1hich ::;ot a hcad.c.:tn::t, becau
nc of strater;ic control of one 
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stage of the incluct;:y or the technology of rroduction, or because of entrepreneurial 
foresight and initiative, or becauoe of a combination of all three, were able to 
absorb in one uay or a not he:..· the wea::e::: and r.iore vulnerable f irr.i::;. This process 
continued until D or:iall number of lar:::;e firms faced each other, each with its 
own supplieo ~f :rau oaterial::; and ito o,m r.1ar::et outlets. At that point in 
some cases notably copper-they discovered that their competitive otrum~les 
could be profitably diluted l1ith colluoive r,mr!:et control, i.e. cartel arran3e-
ments to maintain pl'.'ice::; and profit::; by :rcotraining output. Hh.:it usually set the 
limit on the entry of ne,-1 firmo or provided the opportunities for ne,1 entrants 
was the zcai:city or availability of the natural resource::; indiopenzable for 
prof itablc production. Thus, the cl i::;covery of ne,1 copper depoci ts in Hontana 
in the lOOJs provided the basic fo:;:- the ncu Anaconda company to bre.:11: the control 
of the Lal:e Hichican producin:::; pool; the discovery of the Te::ao oilfield::; at the 
turn of the century nade it poszible for the Tc::as Co. and Gulf Oil to challenge 
the he:::;e □ony of StandDrd Oil. In contraot, Alcoa'::; control of bau::itc 10 deposits 
11
and hydroelectric rcsources helped to effectively prevent the entry of new 
companiez to the United Stateo industi:y until after Horld Ha;: II, ,-,hen Jamaican 
deposits becan to be used by r,cynolclc and I:aiser. 
Another inportant factor uncle::-lyinr; the change in the nature and ccope of 
economic o:r:::;anization wao the cr.icr:::;ence of national r.iar:~ctc in the Hct:ropolcc 
to displace the cnall, unintecrated local r.im:-::ets Hhich had p:·cviously c;~istcd. 
In lar~c part thin ua::; due to the revolution in trano port - cc pccially the 
emergence of the :;.-ailuay - in the con::e::t o:2 ::-apidly :::;rouin::; u:::ban incomes. Thc::ie 
channcs □cant tllat the typical firn had to attain national cize - in the case of 
the United :::tatec, continental size - in orde::- to coopetc. Itc r.1a;:l:ctin3 outlets 
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had to be c:.tabli::::hed accordingly. For a ::::ir:ri.lar rea:.on, it had to :::eel~ out 
and acquire l'1ithin the lietropole a::: nuci1 of t::e re:.erve:::: of the nm r.mtcrial 
and ancilla:::-y ;:ecource::; needed to produce it, a::; pos::;ible. This ,,,a::; and is 
neces:.ary not only to enoure ;onc-:t:£.::..~;.1 supplie:::: fo:r iUi rcf:ine::ieo 
and fabricator::::, but also and no le::;::; ir.1portant, to reduce t~1e actual and 
potential availability of theoe :::;upplieo to its corapetitors.Thi:::; civcs rise to 
the frequently ob:::;erved phenomenon of firo::; which acquire and ~1old raw material 
reserve::; far in e::ce:::s of their P'.:::::1pective need::; for decade::: to come. 
(iii) The 11ultinationalization of T11e Typical Firra 
The proceo:::; by which the typical fir□ establi::;hed raarl~etinc outlets and 
raw mate:::-ial facilties in foreicn count:::ies ua:::; a lo::;ical e::teni;ion of the 
procei;s by which it became verticnlly inte:::;:..·ated in structure and national in 
::;cope. A::; the r.m::-:~ct became international, the firr.1:::: cane into coopctition 
with firo.::; fron other llctropoles uhich had al:::;o undergone the p:·occ:::;:::; of 
national vertical integration. liet:ropolitan firr.10 therefore began to compete 
with each other on each other':::; own hor.1e ground, a::; well a::: for the □arl:ets 
and the rau r.1aterials of the Ilinterlnnd count:de:::;. 
Ilcnce r.mr::cting sub::::idiaries nnd then refineries ucre set up by the American 
oil companieo in l:urope, and vice veroa, after t11e :.?irot Horld Uar. A French 
firm tried (and failed) to penctrnte Alcoa'::; preoerve - the U.S. r:mrl:et - in the 
occond decade of tl1e century; oub::::equently the Ar:ierican fi::o in turn .:-cached 
out to acquire hdyro-power site::; and aiur:iini=.1 cmcltin3 facilties in France and 
Norway: it had already cecured a la:::::;e :::lice of Canada'::; :1ydro-p0Her potential. 
On the raw r:iate:ria 1 cide, the Ar:1.e::icnn col_)per coopanics had by 19~-J ::::ecured 
control of all the iral_)ortnnt coppe::- ::e::::c;:ve:::: of Chile and Hc::ico. Conr;olc:.e 
and Zambian copper :1ad - naturally - been incorporated into tl1e productive apparatuo 
of ;:;:nglis!i an<l ::uropean companie::::. Alcoa 1 :::; con:::rol of the impo::tant bau::itc dcpo::::ito 
u" 
of Suri.nan and Guyana waa also cor..1plete by 192C. Araerican and Anclo-Dutch 
fi.rma fou::;llt spiritedly for He1~ican oil at the turn of the nineteenth century; 
in the 192::)s the battlecround shifted to Venezuela and the Hi.ddle =:aat. 
t By the 192Js nt the lntest, the present-day pattern of oultinati.onal··oorporatc 
o,;mers!1ip of :::1ese ·::h:-cc oi.ne::-al-resou::ce i.nduatri.es in the Aneri.can Hiriterla-nd 
had been set, Chi.le 1s copper was ver::i.cally integrated with the facilities of 
Anaconda and I~ennecot, Sud.nan's and Guyana 'a bauxite ,-1ith the facilities of 
:;he Alcoa-Aluni.niuu Ltd. eoaplen nost of Venezuela 1s oil forc.1ed part of the 
oultinati.onal o:r~ani::ations of Jerccy Standard, Shell, Gulf ancl Te::aco, 
Subsequently, Ja::iaica 'a bauxite ua: cecu::-ed to the nceda of Alean Aluaini.u□ Ltd., 
Reynold::; Hetalc ancl I~aiser Alu::tlnur:i. 
(iv) The P:::ocessec of G:!.·owth, Deve lopr,1cnt and r..eaource Allocation For the Fi.rm. 
It coes uit!1out aayinc that the cor.1ple:: and fascinatinc procecs of the 
firm's continued ::;::..-outh nnd developr..1ent involves all the dir.1ensionc of activity 
already outlined; i.e. the continued d:.:ive for ncu raar:~ets and new raw r:iatcrial: 
rcaerves, the continued roundinc out, and c:;~tension, of ita intccrated structure. 
The inatitutionalization of r.esearch and Developr.tcnt for thcreduction of costs 
and for product innovation ia of courae an inportant part of this p:.·occsc. 
What is of particular importance to the p::.-csent analysis arc tuo aa pect:::; of 
the firo 's cro,-1th process: (a) hou it allocates itc needed rau r.1atcrial 
production bctuccn different um matcl."ial- producinr; sub:::idiariec; (b) how it 
allocates ita production, financial and research -:.-enources betlJccn cliffcrcnt 
end-product::;. Doth process ca, c1s I shall cubacquently elaborate, have an 
important effect on the determination of the level of output in the nineral-
c:~port induct:.-y of the Hinterland countries in the ct1ort, r.1ediun ancl lone run. 
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Ci) r.aw lJa terialn 
Intuitively, it can be asi.u□cd that the first factor ta!:en into account 
in detcrr:tl ning the dii.tribution of production between raw material oubsidiarics 
is the structure o:[ relative cost::: (includinc ta::cs) in the different oubsidiaries. 
Other thin[;S bcini equal, we would im::i::;ine that the cor.ipany would allocate its 
raw mate:;:inl production :::o that the nun total of ;'tax-paid,: cont::: of all 
suboidiarics reprcbents the leaot cootly way of obtainin3 the sur:i total of the 
raw material:; it necdn to oupport itn end-product output. Other thines, of 
course, arc uoually ggec;.ual, i.o r.iucb :::o that one has to ta:~c e::plicit account of 
other factori. in an abstract analy:::i::: i[ t-1e a:;.·e to hope to understand the 
actual raw oatcrial policies of t~1e f i:r □:::;. 
The r.io::it inr,ortant c:ualification to the "leant-cost :i rule a:::ises out of 
certain factoi:n which place a ponitivc value on the firr:i '::: naintaining ti fairly 
wide gco•political npread of l."a\,;r r.u::iterial nuppliei.. Usually the:::e :fuctors 
arise out of the actions of national Governments. Some oupply nourcen arc 
eiven prefcrentia 1 acce::;s to ::;omc r:ia::l~etn bccau:::c of neo-r:icrcpntili::it polid.e:i 
(c.r;. Ame~-ican oil on the American r.1a::::et). In r:ioi:;t countrien the :H:.:ms mu::it 
develop and maintain nor:ie acceptable level of production of the :::coourcc an 
a condition of sccurin:::; and l:eepin::; rcsou::ce conceirnion:::. And there are differences, 
frequently wide difrcrcnccs, bet·wecn the degree of political risks in diffcreot coun-
tries. · 
, :3uch facto:;.·::; limit, but do not cl-~~-.:oy, the ope::ation of the lea:.t 
co:.t principle. A ctanda::-d pattern appea:.:::: to be for the firr.1s to maintain a 
certain eco-political sp:rcad of nm oate::ial production, and to allocate over 
tirac the bul!: o:E incrcncntal production in one or a i:;rnall nur.ibc:: of pa=ticula::: 
low-cost aourcc::i ac itc rau nate::ial ncecl::; ~l."OW. At the sar.1e time, the firmc 
arc constantly ncc!:in~ ncu sourccc of l'au r:iatcl:'ialo in o:.:dc:::- to 't-1idcn thei:: 
options, reduce thei;: conpetitor::;' option::;, and displace depleted oou:rces. 
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The logic of thi::: ic that the firo 1::; plannin3 muct include the planned displacement 
of any c::ictinr; cou::ce of ::;upply7 includinr; (and for some rea:::on::: especially) 
each one located in each Hinterland count:::-y. 
The planned dicplaceraent of each cource operate::; both on the level of 
the fire's actual intention::; and on the level of itc contin3ency planninc. Any 
given sou::ce rJay be abruptly lo::;t to the fi:::-□ because of a chance in Government 
_policy, c::propriation, war or such other act::; of men which the fi::n r.ii[;ht well 
put in the ::;ar.1e category ac Actr. of God. Thuc, there mi.mt be a contingency plan 
fo::: such unforeseen dcvelopoents. nut: for tllcse particular :::ource::: ,-,here the 
rate of e::traction is relatively hi::;h becau:::c incrcraental production is beinz 
located there, the fi:::o oust actively plan for that aorc or les::: foreseeable 
point in the future when it uill locate incremental procluction at come other 
oource or :::ct of :::ou::ccs. The most iopo:rtant prcs:::urcs r;ivinr; :rise to thio 
arc the depletion of hir;h-crade o:: eD:::ily-c::tractcd ::-eservc::: of the natural 
resource ancl the as:::ociatcd ::;rowtll in e:;traction co:::t:::; and the r;rowth of the 
ta:: rate and pe::.-hap::: of otnte intervention as the Ilinterland Govcr-nment strum~lcs 
for a 3rowinr; cha:::-e of the lar:;e ourplunes realized by the induotry. 
The !1ictory of the oil ccr.Jyu.icc ~Jroviclcc the mo:::t :::i1arply defined c.:ises 
of plannccl tli:::placement of supply con:rces. Ara1erican oil conpanic::: :::hiftcd 
increocntal production f::.."Ora the United State::; tc, Hcxico in the ea::ly twentieth 
century, froo i:Ie::ico to Venezuela betucen the 19200 and 19l:-O:::, from Venezuela 
to the Hiddle :a:::t 1950c 19GJc , c1nd will shift progressively to Africain the nnd . . 
end Alaska in the 1970s.. ~;~c the coprs:c 2nd alumin:··n. firms also behaved in 
ai.1alogous ·ways. Anacond8 an,:l I(enn'3cot lac~ tee: incremental output in Chile from 
tl1e !.920s to the 1940s, and tb:::T.1. i:;:,..:.:~~:-d heck to United St.ates sources when 
they got into trouble with ·i.:he Chilean Gcvernment, 
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Alcoa and Alcan shifted from the U.S
. to Guyana and Surinar.i for their ba
uxite 
to Jamaica and the Dominican Uepubli
c
supplies from the 192Os to the 194O.
s, 
and will ohift increasingly to Aust
ralia and Africa
after the Second World War, 
in the 197O.s. 
There is a striking historical analo
gy here between the behaviour of the
 
corpori:ltions and the behaviour of th
e plantation economics of the New W
orld over 
Best haz noted that plantation capit




incremental production - from one H
interland country to another. 
12 
for such shifts ,,ere (i) the exhaus
tion of the soil and the attraction 
of virgin 
low-wage labour
lands in other Hinterlands, (ii) the
 restlessness of the slave Oi:' 
(iii) changin8 patterns of Hetropoli
tan preferential trade policy. The 
force, and 
first two arc clearly analogous to t
he depletion of high-grade reserves 
and the 
growing interventionism of the Hinte
rland Government in multinational m
ineral 
economy. 
Insofar as any r;iven commodity tends
 to e::periencc a low-high-
(b) _End-Products. 
low growth cycle over the long-run, 
this has certain important implicati
ons for 
It is 
the relative specialization and dive
rsification of the firm's product mi
x. 
widely accepted that the goals of th
e corporations are long-tcrr.i profita
bility 
The pursuit of these objectives, it 
appears, has led to the interestin3
and growth. 
pattern for the firms investigated t
o specialize in a particular commod
ity when 
its growth rate is high, and then to
 shift incremental resources out of 
that 
commodity as its :::;::-owth rate levels 
off or falls, into another cor.imodity
 which is 
By such mcanc the fi:.:mi::; have
then e::pericncin0 i tc period of rapid 
i:;rowth. 
bencfittcd from the rapid-growth pha
:::c of a particular commodity, but th
eir 
growth has t:ranscendcd the fate of a
ny one commodity and embraces those 
of 
others in their hiih growth phase. 
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In the oil industry, the shiftc have been to jointly-produced commodities. 
First, the companiea :::hifted incrementally from l::eroscnc to r;asoline in the early 
part of the century ai:. electric lir;htinc displaced the l::eroscne lamp and as the 
automobile revolution created an e::plosively growing r;as mar!~et; then since 1950 
they have shifted incrementally into pctrochemicala as the rate of r;rowth of 
demand for ::;asolcne levelled off in the United State::; and the demand for 
petrochemicalG ha::; crown rapidly. In the copper industry, the ::;hift has been 
to a competinr: comodity: Anaconda, r.evcre Copper and Kennecot all acquired 
stal::es in the alur:iinium industry in the post-Second World Uar period, as this 
commodity ate hunr;rily into the incre..iental market for metals. It is not difficult~. 
to recognize the reasons for these incremental choices: shiftinc into jointly­
produced cornr.iodities ma::es ui:.e of the firms e~:isting production facilities, 
shifting into cor.1peting commodities mal::es use of their cJ:i::;tin3 r.1arl::eting facilitiei:.. 
There is mo:=c to it however. na::;ic to the proccsi:. of 3rowth and displace­
ment of commoditicc a.:-c the twin enr;inei:. of changing technology and changing 
demand. The fi-::r.1::; a'l:'e themselves deeply involved in influencin3 these chances: 
their large r.csea-;:-ch and Development ci:.tablishmcnts arc constantly developing 
new products baned on their resourcec and nc,-1 ways in which customcrc can use 
their products; their large propa3anda activities arc geared to c::panding 
demand for tbci:: c:::iatinz and new product lines. In other word::; their tcch­
nologica land p~opaganda efforts nece::ica~ily include activities designed to 
promote product::; uhich arc jointly produced, or competitive, to their main 
product line::;. ny such means they help insure themselves againct the looses, 
and help a::;sure thcmsclvea of the bencfitc, from lonc.,.te,:m i:.hifts in technolozy 
and/o:: demand uhich affect the enti:-c industry. 
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The logic of all this is that part of 
the firms' planning QUSt in~lude 
lin~ willL.?._r.ot,h_er one,
the plannC'd incrC'r:icnta 1 d i~_l?.1~!!.lli'Ll.L
l..:E... li'!lif..;.;.Zf-'1 t!::: t 
and that ther~ have been, in the p.sct, 
pcr-iods when the firms have both planne
d 
On the basi5 of this, it is r.ot surpris
ine
and carried out such displacements. 
to learn that the oil companies have bc
clln to diaplay intcreot in the nuclear 
power indui:;try, which has begun to coop
etc with diesel and natural gas-generat
ed 
have not ao far seen any evidenceOne ,;.;o L'.J.d also e,:pcct - although Ielec.tricity. 
of this - that some pa::t of the plannin
.c of the aJ.umin:'.:t::i firms should include
 a 
strategy for that time when the dcr:tand 
for plastics reaches_thc point where it
 
becomes a real threat to the l·apJ.d ~ro
uth 0f the firms sp~cializin3 in the 
white metal. 
All these factors - the proceoo of allo
cetine output bet~ecn ~i.ff~rent 
raw m:iteria 1 s1:bsidiaries, the phenome
na of plan"."!0d dis pL".c0mcr..t cf supply 
so~rce ar.d of produced commodity - .::re 
inp-;rtar;.t in the ai:'1alysis of lar.g-ru.n 
output-det:ermination of the mine:rc:·,1-e:~
port in the HinterJ..nnd country, ~s we 
Also, t~1ey th.:-o~,: :i.ntc:rcsting l:i.ght 0:1 c
b~n~~-,,-P: '""''°'.:..:,r:.-.:
shall s 1:b:::cqucntly t...:e. 
in the use r.i-::i.de by Hctropolitan c.1pita
l cf ti,c reo'Jurccs of the m.n!:crland wo
rld 
through time. Finally, t,__ -.,_, pn~t:.':: to t
he r·.ce<l to recast the mold cf theories
 
of intc:cl"'.ational t,:adc 8~.d inte, -~-.tior:
al :;..::-.vestment into institu'.~ional c2tc3o
ries 
which s;:-e more rclcvnr.t, at least s0_,..
·s
__.:,,: thcoc tl~cori.~s rel:o!te to trade and
 
Implicit in llhat has bce::1 sal.d :rn :~ar 
is the idea that the typ5r-~. ~nl-•d~.ia'..:
j 
of these firmn iD e.n o:q;anic pm:t of a 
r.1uJ::i-sta~e, r:;,_.ltin.s.tional and perhaps 
multiproduct en1:erp:dse with a sinclc 
cem:ralizcd resourcc-ell-:,catjon end pla
nning 
On the bas:i.s cf c:n c.~~nminatinn of nea:-.:-ly
 or:.e hundred of
ar;cncy at the head. 
following picture of the typical admini~t~ativc structive of'thc modern, large, 
vertically-integrated multiproduct firm: 
"At the top is a general office. There, general executives and staff 
specialists coordinate, appraise and plan goals and policies and allocate 
resources to a number of quasi-autonocous, fairly self-contained divisions. 
Each division handle::; a major product line or carries on the fir □ 's activities 
in one larce geographic area. Each division'::; central office, in turn, adminis­
ters a number of departments. Each of these dcpart □cnts is responsible for 
the administration of a major function - manufacturing, selling, purchasing or 
producinr; of raw materials, en3inccrin3, research, finance and the like. The 
departr:iental headguarters in its turn coordinates, appraises and plans for a 
each field unit plantnumber of field units. At the lowest level, runs a or 
works, a branch or district sales office, a purchasing office, an engineering 
research laboratory, an accountinr; or other financial office, and the like. 
The four types of administrative positions in a large multidivisional enter­
prise arc thus: the field unit, the depart □cntal headquarters, the division's 
central office, and the general office. "13 
amongst the ir.iportantChandler noticed that the copper co□panies and Alcoa were 
exceptions to those cor:ipanics l'Jhich evolved a highly formalized structure with 
operations and ad □inistration so clearly differentiated from long-term planning. Thus 
"Since World War I, the over-all policy-r.wl:ing at Anaconda was carried out in weekly 
meetings of the heads of the functional subsidiaries 11, ll~ and "The Kcnnecot story has 
been one of increasing centralized adr:iinistrativc control 11, 
15 finally, at Alcoa "At 
the central office, each of the three r::,;;ccutivc Vice-Presidents has charge of a group 
of several functional Departments. 
1116 and "Overall appraisal and planning are carried 
on at Alcoa by the three E;:ccutivc Vice-Presidents, the President, the Chairman of the 
Board, and the Chairmen of the Executive and Finance Committees. ul
7 In other words, 
in these firms the function of long-terr.i planning did not become sharply differentiated 
fror.1 the function of overall adrainistration of the firra, but the centralization of 
control over Departments and field units l1as no less evident. lC The □odel stri:cturc 
outlined by Chandler can, therefore, be used to illustrate the relationships of the 
raw material subsidiaries which comprise the mineral-c:~port industries of the 
Hinterland countries, with the firms of ,i1hich they arc 
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constituent part::;. In terms of the four-tier systcr.i noted in the long quotation 
above, the ra,~ oaterial sub::iidiary exi::it::; at the lowest tier: the level of 
the field unit. In this cater;ory would fall the copper-producing subsidiaries in 
Chile, the crude oil and bau~dte-minin3 suboidiarics in the countries in and 
around the Caribbean. r~au material production a::; a whole for each firm fall::; 
into the category of the department, while all the different ::ita3cs of vertically­
integrated production - say, for coppe;: and aluminiur.1 - fall into the category of 
the division ,,hich in some actual caseD al::io corrc::iponds to the enterprise as a 
whole. In the li:::;ht of thi::;> Chandler's description of the tasl~s and responsibilities 
of each tic:- in the atructurc in instructive. 
"Only in the firnt, the field unit, are the manar;er::i primarily 
involved in carryinr; on or personally supervising day-to-day activities. 
Even here, if the volur.ic of activity in large, they spend uuch of their 
time on adr.iinistrative dutic::;. Dut · nuch duties arc larr,ely operational, 
carried out within the fraoeworl~ of policies and procedure::; ::;ct by depart­
mental headquarters and the hir-;hcr offices. The departmental and 
divisional offices cay mal~c ::;or:ie lonr;-term decision::;, but becauoe their 
e::ecutives \-Jorl~ within a comparable frameworl~ deteroined by the general 
office, their primary adr.iinintrative activitie::; also tend to be tactical 
or operational. The general office mal~es the broad stratcr;ic or 
entrcprcncu:.·ial decisions as to policy and proccdu:;:-e,s and can do so 
larnely because it has the final ::>ay in the allocation of the firm's 
resource::; - men, money and r.mtcrial::; •· neces::;ary to carry out these 
adraini::itrative decisions and actions and other::; raade with its approval 
at any level. 11 19 (Hy emphasis) 
A sharper definition of the otructurc of administration, cor.rrnodity flows 
and cash flous \lithin the firm can be civen by diagrar.un.atic representation. 
2.J
In 'Figures 1 and 2 i I have adapted Chand le;:'::; Chart showinc the adrainistrativc 
structure of the nultidivisional fi:::r:i,fo:;: e1e present purpooc. A uni-divisional 
firm is shoun (oil, copper) alu□ iniup) in which the Central Office ca-::rics out 
bOth the function of long-term planninr; and that of central coordination of the 
functional Departr:ients. In Figure 1, In::itructions arc seen to flow downwards 
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from the Ccnt:::al Office to the Depa:-tmental Headquarters and finally to the 
Field Units, while information flous upwards from the Field Units to the Depart,: 
mental Headquarters and finally to the Central Office. The Central Office's 
instructions to the Departments concc-::-n such r.:atters as the coordination of 
mining, refinin:;, fabricating and sellin:3, which each Departmental Headquarters 
then translates into operational output and shipment decisions for itD Field 
Units to car.:y out. The Field Unit·s supply _of i!1forrr.ation to the Departmental 
Headquarters concern such r.1atters as local cost, labour, ta:~ and/or marketing 
conditions. This information is consolidated into Departr,1ental conditions for 
each Departocnt, which can then be supplied to the Central Office to enable it 
to take rational decisions. 
Also represented in Fir;urc 1 arc the directions of the main commodity 
movements ,-,ithin the fir □. The firo 1s nain product r:iovcs fror.i. mines to refineries 
to factories and finally to sales unitn, from l-Jhich it coco to the firm's customers. 
Centralized purchases of supplies arc effected by the Purchasing Department's 
units which then direct then to field unit::: of all Departments. The volume, 
.mix and prices of these intra-firr:i conmodi ty flows arc dcteroined by the Central 
Office in accordance with the firm's objectives of maxi.mizinr; its lone-term 
profitability and crouth, and minioizin:::; its lnbour, material!. and ta=:: disburse­
ments, 
To round out the picture, Fir;urc 2 .:eprcscnts the □ain cash-flow movements 
within the [irr.1 on current account. (C.::pital account r:i.ovements nould complicate 
the Diagram and in any case present fc,·1 problems of e;::position). Cash is shown 
to be generated by the Sale'.'iDcpartoent and pl.1ced at the disposal of the 
Finance Dcpa;..·tmcnt. Finance in tu:;:-n allocates cash to all the Departments 
(includinz itself) in accordance Hith the operational implications of the 
Figure 1: Administrative 
and Commodity Flows for 
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Central Office'::; decisions. Cash is sent to the Fu·.:-chasinr; Department to cover 
the costs of centrally pu;:-chascd nupplicn, as well as the op-:!rational costs 
of that Department. C.::ish is ser.t to the other De partr.wntr, to cover locally 
purchased supplies and other local con ts, i. c. ,•7.:lf'.CS, naL:::.:icn and local ta~tes. 
The cash surplus of the firm consistn of the c:~cess of the receipts of Finance 
from Sales over its cash outlays to ~1~ the Dcpartracnts. For all Departments 
other than Finance and Sales, the 
11surplun II consists of the eJtcess of the 
imputed value of the r;oods aad ::icrviccs supplied to othei~ Dcr>arLments over 
the sum of the impnted value of the r;oodc and nerviccs tfll:cn from other 
Ilencc thene surplusesDepartments plun the canh outlays received fro□. Fin1rncc. 
at the Depa;:-tmcntal nnd Field l'ni~ lcvcis
21 
have neither a cash nor an operational 
significance, they arc nccountine itccJ dctcruiced centrally in accordance with 
The relationship of cnch r.:m r,1atcriaJ producir:r; nuhsiclfary l·n.th its 
parent firm can now be easily idcnti.ficcl by lool:inr; at the ponition of the 
mining field unit in the diar;rnm. Each such unit receive::; frora its prent 
(i) instruction5 about the level, nntu:re .2nd destination of itn output; (ii) 
goods and/ or services eithc,. prcduccd uj thin the firm or p•.t:-chascr:1. centrally; 
and (iii) cash to meet loc:1 l pu:rchv.sen, labou::- and ta:: paym~ntn. In turn it 
provides the parent with (:i.) the rau ra.:1tcrialn .:is innt:ructcd, l'nd (ii) information 
about production conditionn to asnist future d~cisj_on-::-::;il~ine. 
This means that fo,: mnny, H not all, ::.·aw r.1atcri_c1l subsidiaries many of 
the decisions which the tradition~l theory of the fire ~ssurae::i to be internal 
decisions are ta~cn ~:tcrnally. The level, price and dcntlnation of output; 
the sourcca, priccn and ponnibly npccifi.cations o::: inputs; and the techniques 
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of production utilized, arc all contained in instructions or decisions previously 
ta1:en by _the hi3hcr offices. The objective of the manager of Chile Copper Co, 
or Rcynoldo Jamaica l-Iines is not "profit-maximization" per ~ at all; it is to 
produce the quantum of natcrial ordered by the higher office::: ,,ith the least 
possible delay and at the least pos::::ible local costs, and place it at the 
disposal of the pa::-cnt company. For those of us who arc accustor:icd to thin!: of 
a "Hanazcr" as sooeonc with independent initiative, it would be r.10:.:c appropriate 
to thinl: of the manager of the :.:a,-1 r:wterial subsidiary ac bein:3 in rauch the same 
position as a plant supervisor. 
A cecond level of structu::al dependence for the ra,., materialsubsidiary 
relates to the rate and direction of chance of its activities. That is, the 
rate C?f.new invcstnent and of e:-:pan::.io1.1. of ca;,acity, the techniques of production 
used, and the a,:"quicition of noi-1. '.'r:i.a:::-1:et::; 11 a:rc all decisions which a:ce derived from 
the long-tern planning decisions ta:~en by the Central Office. To :3ivc only one 
illustration: it rnal:es very little sense to analyse the degree to ,-,hich the 
raw material ::iubsidiary 11rcinvcsts 11 its profits. Reinvestment policies arc 
determined centrally, 11reinvestment 11 in the raw material subsidiary is derived 
from the deterraincd e:~pansion of end-product capacity and decisions about the 
locus of ncu rau material capacity. It is quite possible for the firm's 
global rcinvcstr.icnt ratio to be hizh but its reinvestocnt in any ::;ivcn subsidiary 
low; the opposite is also quite possible; and in the real ll01.·ld both phenor.iena 
have been observed. 
II 
2
Hinterland r:conony And The Ilincral-I:::port Industr/ 
Against this bacl:ground of the cmcq;ence, structure and behaviour through 
time of the vertically-integrated nultinational firn, it is pos::.iblc to arrive at 
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certain insights about the mineral-c:;po:rt industries of the Hinterland. Such 
insights arc yielded by an understandinc of the subsidiary-parent company 
relationship. In this part of the paper I wish to discuss in bread outline the 
question of foreign ownership, the question of output-determination, the effects 
of the industries on the "national" economics in which they arc located, and the 
attempts of the Government to transr.iit economic development from the industry to 
the national economy by its ta::ation and expenditure policies. 
(i) Forei13n OwnersbjJ.~. Seen in its historical pcr~pectivc, the acquisition of 
the natural r~sourcc industries of Hinterland countries by Hetropolitan firms 
was merely the result of the e:;:tcnsion of a process which had already taken place 
in the Mctropole. This ,-,as the process by which small-scale, single-stage, 
competitive producers oriented to local mad:ets were swallowed up by large, 
vertically-intecrated, oligopolistic producers oriented to the national and 
ultimately to the international marl~et. In Venezuela and in Chile, as in the 
United States, copper mining and oil c::traction ,-,ere in the hands of small 
producers in the middle of the nineteenth century. Hhat then took place was 
a revolution in economic organization which cut virtually unresisted across 
national boundarieo, e:{tendin:3 itself into the American Hinterland. Independent 
miners in the Ilctropole and HinterlandG alike were transforr.ied into wage-
labourers, and small capitalist, into rainority stocl~holders, of the large 
corporations. For the miners of l-Iontam:1 the enemy became the "capitalists 
from New Yorl~ ", for the Venezuelan.s and Chileans it was to become the "foreign 
capitalisto" or the "Yanl~ee Ir.iperiali.sts "; both perhaps, unconsciously, were 
attacking the f:lame historical development. The concern about the denationalization 
of Chilean copper which aroused a lively debate in thet country from the 
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23second decade of the century, waG clearly historically analogou3 to the 
complaints about 11biG business" which becan to be heard in the United States 
a generation before. 
It ia interesting here to consider briefly two of the reasons most 
frequently advanced for the past and continuinc prevalence of foreign capital 
investment in the:,e industries in the Hinterland countrieG. These arc the alleged 
shortage of capital, and the· alleged.- tcch.nological backwardness of these countries. 
In at lea:Jt one historical instance - that of Chile - it uas strongly 
argued by contemporary national observers, including economists, that the 
quantity of capital funds required to set up the industry on the new basis 
2L}
was available within the country. It is possible that further research could 
yield other cases. But even if for the sal~e of the analysis it was assumed that 
these countriea were short of capital at the time, this by itself doca not 
demonstrate that they had to rely on direct foreir;n investment. Purely on the 
basis of the historical profitability of these industries, it could easily be 
shown that had hypothetical national capitalists borrowed abroad the funds 
required for the early investments, the subsequent flow of profita was sufficient 
to service this indebtedness and ultimately repay it, aa well as to pay dividends 
and to finance . f . 1 25at least a part of further investment ·rom interna sources. 
The immediate reply uill naturally be "perhaps, but could they have sold the 
product on an internationa 1 market controlled by a few oligopolistic firms?" 
This is precinely the point: the national capitalists - or more properly the 
small, single-ata~e producera, - were defeated at the level of economic organization. 
Moreover, the defeat admitted no recovery through the mechanisms of the private 
capital market: the corporations normally own all of the capital stock of their 
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raw material subsidiaries and do not trade this stocl: even on the metropolitan 
capital market. ;:ven if national capital was short then but is available in whole 
or in part ~. the stocl: is simply not for sale. 
It is virtually the sar.ie where technolocy is concerned. In most cases, 
the technolocy used initially in these industries was not cnorr.iously complex 
or inaccessible. In the cases of the : 1 Tcnientc and Chuquicamata mines in 
Chile, the technical changes needed to bring the deposits into lar3e-scale 
production were carried out after foreir;n capital acquired the mines; that is, 
the necessary technical change was induced by the cor.uncrcial potential of the 
deposits in the conte:,;:t of a rapidly crowing marl:et. Subsequently the process 
of technological change was institutionalized by the r,esearch and Development 
departments of the corporations. Local capitalist::; and the local Government 
could not develop either the incentive or the resources to engai:;e in their own 
technological research, since they did not own the industry. 
The real question to be answered, therefore, is why is it that these 
countries failed to develop large-scale, vertically-inte13ratcd, capital-and 
technology-intensive corporations capable of resisting the advance of the 
Metropolitan firms. Insofar as the revolution in economic organization in the 
United States was itself the product of revolutions in the scale of demand 
and methods of production, then the further question must be why these changes 
in demand and technology failed to take place in the countries South of the 
Rio Grande as well. The ansi-1er ta!:cs ui:: to the roots of development and under­
development itself. It almost certainly lies in the differing effects of the 
26
different typen of colonial economic institutions in the New Horld, on the 
potential for the steady growth of the purchasini::; power of the r.1ai::s of the 
population; and on the opportunities for upward social and economic mobility 
.. 2t~ -
enjoyed by the numerically dominant ethnic and/or social groups. 
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If this 
interpretation is broadly correct, then the origins of the institutional dependence 
of these induGtrics oust be sought in the historical evolution of the economics 
from centuries before. 
(ii) Output-Determination. To say that the mineral-e2;:port industries are 
dependent on e,;:ternal deaand is to misn the point in an important sense. Output 
is rather dependent on the needs of and alternatives open to the particular 
firms whose subsidiaries operate in the industry. Let us assuae the simplest 
possible case: a :::ingle metropolitan firn producing and sellin3 the end-product 
on a sin13le metropolitan market, d:rmiinc its raw material from a sinclc 
Hinterland nource. The cost conditions for the e:;:troction of the raw material 
form part of the total cost conditions of the firm: thene total cost conditions, 
in conjunction with demand corrditions for the end-oroduct, deterainc the 
equilibriur.1 quantity trc:dcd on the □ar:~et. This equilibriuo (given the ratio of 
raw material to end-product) determines the level of output/exports of the 
mit).cral resource industry in the Hinterland. 
In thin, the simpliest case, there is a clear and unambi13uoun relation­
ship between der:iand for the end- product and the output.· (derived demand) for the 
raw material. Changes i.n the level of output will depend on changes in the 
structure of relative prices and in the level of income on the metropolitan 
market, in conjunctioc. with the relevant elasticities of der:iand the end­for 
product. They will also depend on chances :i.n the: firm's cost conditions and in 
the ra,-1 material: end product rc=,tio. 
However in the rc.::il Horlc1 there 2rc many marl:ets, .:aany firma and many supply 
sources. Typically, the cc arc a r~11mber of firr:i.s in each market, drawing their 
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raw materials from a number of 
geo-political sources, and in m
any cases more 
To 
than one firm drawn its raw mat
erial fron the sa □e Hinterland c
ountry, 
isolate the effects of these fac
tor::: on the output-determinatio
n picture, let 
us retain the as:::umption of a s
ingle raetropolitan market which
 absorbs the 
entire end- product output, and 
let un tal:e as given and fixed s
uch factors 
as the level and rate of r;ro,1th
 of raetropolitan income, the inc
or:ie-elasticity 
of demand for the end-product, 
the structure of relative prices
 and the price­
end product ratio. The other
elasticities of der.iand, and the
 ra,;-1 171aterial: 
assumptions of the simple case 
will be relm:ed gradually to in
dicate the additional 
factors determining output. Th
e original firm will be called F
irm :~ and the 
The fraracuorl~ of output-determi
nation is 
original Hinterland, Country A. 
diagramatically represented in 
Figure 3 a::: Cane 1. 
First, assune that there is ano
ther firm on the mai:'ket Firr:1_x d
rawing 
This is represented 
its raw materials from another 
Hinter-land country, called B. 
The additional factor determinin
g A's output is the 
as Case 2 in Figure 3. 
The larger :: 's share, the large
r, cet. par., 
share of market supplied by }: . 
will be A's output, and vice ve
rsa. A's extraction costs wi 11 a
ffect :;~ 1 s market 
But a number 
share through their effects on ~
~•s production costs, it is true
. 
of other factora will affect X'
s rnarl~et share, such as its mar
keting ability, 
its rate of technological innov
ation, and possibly even marl:et 
sharing agreements. 
The interesting ir:1plications of
 this in that A's output relativ
e to n's does 
it can be a 
not necessarily reflect its pro
duction costs relative to n's: 
relatively hieh-coct producer a
nd yet enjoy a hi13her share of 
raw material 
output for e~::a171ple, because the
 non-raw oaterial production co
sts of its parent 
are much lo·wer than those of B'
s parent. Naturally, the oppos
ite can also hold, 
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Another vital implication is that the rate of growth of A's output relative 
to B's depends exclusively on the rate of growth of Firm:: relative to Firm Y. 
Thuo a Hinterland tied to a non-dynamic firr.i. will share the fate of that firm, 
and vice versa. 
Now let us cive each firm one additional Hinterland to choose from 
in the satisfaction of its raw material needs. Countries A and Care now 
attached to ;: and countries B and D arc attached to Y (Case 3 in Figure 3). 
In allocating its raw material requirements between A and C, :~ will presumably 
use the "least-cost" principle. In effect, :~ 's minimum cost curve for 
different levels of its end-product output includes the optimum combinations of 
A's and C's output for the total rau material requirements implied by the different 
levels of end-product output, Hhat is now happening is that country A is competing 
with country C ,-Jithin the structure of the firm; its output is determined, ~ 
alia, by its production costs relative to C's. Its competition with other raw 
material produces - Band D - also exists, but it is very indirect and roundabout. 
One ir:iplication of this is that if X's alternative supply source were a differ­
ent country with different co:::;t conditionc · fror:i C':::;, A would be cor.ipeting with a dif-
fcrcnt set of co5t condition5 .:ind uou~d alnost certainly have a different level. of rutp..it. 
In other words since the level of raw material output for any given country depends 
on the alternative suppliers with which it competes through the st:ructure of the 
firm, a different combination of firms with countries implies a different distribution 
of raw material output between countries. 
Finally, let us assume that both :: and Y draw supplies £:i:or:i A, with the 
other conditions unchanged. This' ir; represented as Case l,,. in Figure 3. This brinr;s 
us closcot to the conditions in the real world, where oany oineral-e~~port countrie::i 
have more than one firm drawing supplies from within its borders. A's output is 
now the sum total of the requirements of ,;: and of Y which is drawn from that country. 
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that part controlled by Y 
Xhat part of its reserves co
ntrolled by~ competes with C
, 
Obviously, it is quite feasib
le for the least-cost consid
er­
competes with l3 and D. 
ations to yield a level of o
utput in A which is high for ·
firm X and low for firm 
and so on 
or a high rate of growth of 
output in A for firm Yanda 
low one for firm X, 
Those cases in the real worl
d where a country has experie
nced a period of high 
and sustained growth in its 
mineral-exports - Chile, Ven
ezuela and Jamaica for examp
le 
For in all these cases there
 were 
- well illustrate the operat
ion of these factors. 
three conditions favourable 
to growth: (i) demand on the 
end-product market was grow­
ing rapidly, (ii) the compan
ies controlling the bulk of r
eserves in the country 
the 
controlled an impo:rtan t, and
 sometimes growing, share of/
l_end-product market, and (iii
) 
raw material supply sources 
available to these firms wer
e scarce, or 
the alternative 
Similarly, when the boom pha




ded in the 1950s, this reflec
ted not so much changing 
demand conditions for petrole
um and copper, as the changi
ng end-product and raw ma­
terial ~trategies of the firm
s. Venezuela, it can be said
, was feeling the effects of
 
the oil companies' planned d
isplacement of supply source
; Chile was feeling the effec
ts 
to some degree of the copper
 companies' planned displacem
ent both of supply source 
and of end-product, 
Since it is inherent the nat
ure of these booms that they
 taper off as a result 
of deliberate corporate deci
sions, it makes all the more 
ioportant the question of th
e 
extent to which the operatio
ns of the mineral-export ind
ustries contribute to the 
attainment of self-sustainin
g growth in the Hinterland e
conomies where they come to 
dominate the process of nati
onal income creation. In ot
her words, we have seen that
 
it is inherent in the dynami
cs of the system with which w
e are dealing that the 
the 
survival and cro~·Jth of the c




of any one subsidiary, and s
ometimes of any one product 
line as well, while the raw 
material subsidiaries in a g
iven Hinterland country which
 do enjoy a period of rapid 
growth enter eventually into
 a phase o:i: relative stagnati
on. Our ne},t question is, 
what are the implications of
 the internal mechanics of th
e system for the ability of 
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Figure 3: The Framework Firm X l 
of Out-put Determination 
Case 1 
Hinterland 
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of the national econor.1y 's 1:;rowth and development to L-ranscend the performance of the 
raw material subsidiaries located within it and providing it with much of its dynamic? 
(iii) Dependence and Underdevelopment in Mineral Economy 
The fact is that in all the mineral-export economies in Hinterland 
America the problem of external structural dependence remains acute, and shows 
little sign of being substantially relieved in the near future. I say "remains" 
because most of these economies have had at least twenty to thirty years of 
active Government intervention allegedly designed to diversify the bases of 
economic growth. Many of them (e.g. Venezuela, Chile, Trinidad-Tobago and 
Jamaica) have moreQver been able to finance these policies with relatively 
large tax revenues made available from the mineral industry itself. The 
strategy of using the industry's tax revenues for expenditure designed to 
reduce the economy's dependence on the industry bas been embodied in the 
popular consciousness in Venezuela in the phrase sembrar el petroleo ("sow the 
petroleum") for more or less the last thirty years. 
It would be unnecessary - and probably impossible - to discuss all the 
factors responsible for the persistence of dependence in these economies in 
I wish rather to suggest that there are certain featuresevery individual case. 
inherent in the terms on which these raw material subsidiaries operate which 
are partly responsible for the fact that (a) they do not transmit their growth 
to other strategic growth sectors in the national economy, and (b) the national 
economy stubbornly resists Government attempts to reduce its structural 
dependence on the mineral-export sector. 
(a) The Mineral-Export Industry and the National Econnmy: Before Government 
Intervention 
The first set of considerations concern the failure of the mineral­
export sectors to serve as cntulysts for the diversified development of the 
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national economy, in other words, to play the same role in the twentieth 
century Hinterland countries as trade-oriented industries played in North 
America and Australia in the nineteenth. Why have they remained "enclaves", 
better integrated with the outside world than with their host economies, 
and giving rise to the phenomenon which Rostow and Demas have described as 
"growth without development"? 
The specific manifestations of this has been, in every case investigated, 
the fact that (i) few purchases of local agricultural and manufactured goods 
are made by the industry, (ii) the capital/labour ratio used in the industry 
is high relative to the rest of the national economy, and as a result, labour 
productivity and wage rates are relatively high, but the total labour force 
and the total wage bill are low relative to the national labour force and the 
national wage bill respectively; (iii) profits and depreciation form a high 
proportion of the value of the industry 1s output (also as a result of the high 
capital/labour ratio) but this surplus is either repatriated to the foreign 
owners or reinvested within the mineral-export industry itself: it is not 
invested in other national industries where it can cont-ribute to diversified 
economic growth; finally (iv) as a result of (i) to (iii) above, the value 
of the industry's output "returned' 1 to the national economy(principally local 
purchases, wages and taxes) is well below the total value of its "sales." 
In explaining all this, there are certain predictable argwrents avail­
29able from what we might call Metropolitan "Economic Development" theory 
on the one hand, and from Metropolitan Marxist theory on the other. "Economic 
Development" theory ascribes the smallness of loc a 1 purchases by the industry 
to the underdevelopment of the intermediate and capital-goods manufacturing 
industries, and the fact that extractive industries use little intermediate 
goods in any case. The high capital/labour ratio is held to be due to the 
inherent capital intensity of the industry, and the accrual of profits abroad 
is ascribed to the unavoidable dependence on foreign capital because of 
capital shortage at home. Often it is virtually implied that what does remain 
in the nat:lonal economy in the form of "Returned Value" is largesse which 




on the other hand, would explain the capital intensity 
of the industry in terms of the continued accumulation and deepening of capital; 
and in explaining the smallness of "Returned Value", would assert that the 
very purpose and motivation of imperialist capital is the extraction of a 
surplus from the poor countries. 
I do not doubt that most of these arguments contain an element of 
validity. It is abviously true that underdeveloped countries have underdeveloped 
manufacturing industries, and that bauxite and copper mining and crude oil 
production use relatively little intermediate goods. It is also obvious that 
the processes of electrolic production of copper and aluminum, and the process 
of oil refining, inherently involve large amounts of capital in relation to 
labour. Likewise it is obviously the case that the purpose and motivation 
of all capital investment is to earn a surplus of returns over cost5; so that 
direct foreign investment inevitably leads to a subsequent outflow of profits. 
But in some respects the explanations raise as many questions as they 
purport to answer. It is not clear, for example, why the mineral-export 
·industry does not exert ani preS/3..!l..!'.~ for the establishment of national supply-
ing industries, such as capital goods industries for the supply of the capital 
equipment, and intermediate goods industries for the supply of the materials 
used in such refining as is carried outlocally. Nor is there any full 
explanation for the virtual absence of any tendency for the industry's factor 
propo~tions to adjust to the relatively capital-short, labour-plentiful situation 
in these economies. Capital shortage ar, an explanation of total foreign owner-
9hip looks weaker and weaker in the face of the emergence, in countries such 
as Venezuela and Chile, of a class of domestic capitalists eager to put their 
money to work. Finally, if the objective of imperialist capital is to extract 
a surplus from the ~ntr::,: as such, and assuming that other profitable invest.. 
ment opportunities exist within the country outside of the mineral-export sector, 
why is the surplus not in-,1ested in these other sectors after having made a 
killing in the mineral-export sector? 
My main contention here is that it is to the institutional integration 
of these industries with multimational corporate systems that we should ascribe 
their lack of integration with the national economies. Take first the question 
of the lecus of supp~~:, o~ :;_np1..1ts and capital equipment to the subsidiaries 
which comprise the industry. There is every reason to expect that such goods 
will be supplied to the subsidiary by the headquarters of the parent firm, 
and will be obtained from metropolitan sources. First, some of the inputs 
may be produced by the parent :·:i::m itself, as a result of its horizontal 
integration. Some of the aluminium firms, for example, themselves produce the 
caustic soda for the alu~ina process and the cryolite for the aluminium proce~s. 
Second, the purchase of materials and capital equipment for all subsidiaries 
will in all probability be centralized by the firm's central office, in oTder 
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to effect economies and to standardize the processes used and the goods 
produced at each stage of output. Under these circumstances it is perfectly 
natural that the firm will use well-established metropolitan suppliers. Third, 
the transport of goods to the subsidiary overseas may involve little or no 
real cost to the firm, insofar as they can be shipped on the company's own 
empty ships on the return journey after offloadins the raw material from over­
seas. Both Anaconda and A!can Aluminum Ltd. have used their shipping subsidiar­
ies to carry fuel and other naterials to their plants in Chile and in Jamaica 
respectively. Finally, it must be point~d out that while there may be a fGreign 
exchange shortage for the natimv,11 economy of the Hinterland, this may :·never 
,,,.::J?Y :· reflected in the transact:Lons between the subsidiary and the parent firm. 
In terms of intra-firm account:Lig, the shipment of produce from the subsidiary 
to the parent firm gives ·:-.;~.c ;rn·osidiary a credit in its accounts with the 
parent, against which sup; ::.ies and interest on the farmer's debt with the latter 
are debited, as well .:1S cash transferB to cover local purchases, wages and 
local taxes. The residua}. :form." tl:P. "surplus" which merely remains with the 
parent. On those occasions when the subsidiary's debits with its parent exceed 
its credits - usually because of a large capital investment programme - this 
deficit may be covered simply by an :l.ncrease in the parent's stockholding 
or interest-bearing investment in the subsidiary, i.e. by lending to the subsi-
d
. 321.ary. This type of economic organization ensures that foreign exchange 
is automatically available to finance che imports of the mineral-export industry, 
the producing units in the industry feel no incentive to seek out local supplies 
or to promote the development of supplying industries, even if they had the 
degree of independence from the:i.r head offices which would permit them to do so. 
Closely associated with the question of the degree of linkages between 
the industry and local manufacturing is that of the degree to which the raw 
material is processed or refined into intermediate goods - not to speak of 
end-products - within the national economy. Since some of the processes use 
considerable intermediate materials they establish permissive conditions for 
the stimulation of supplying industries, as well as create additional national 
value added in the form of wages and taxes. However the history of the mineral­
export industries of Hinterland America provides a virtual classic story of 
their relegation to those activities just necessary to get the materials out 
of the country. In Chile the subsidiaries of Anaconda and Kennecot actually 
increased their production of the low-valued blister copper and reduced their 
p~oduction of the higher-valued fire-refined and electrolytic copper in the 
period after the Second Horld Har. Guyana and Surinam were exporting 
bauxite for about forty years before production of alumina began. In Venezuela... 
the proportion of crude oil refined nationally had reached only one-quarter 
in the middle of the 1950 decade; ten years later it was still only slightly 
higher than one-third. 
In every case, the pattern can be traced to the vertical integration 
of raw material output in the Hinterland with the refining capacity of the 
··•. 
companies in the Metropole. Both Anaconda and Kennecot built electrol:y tic:_. 
copper refineries in the United States to process blister copper from thei~ 
Chilean subsidiaries, in the post-War period. Alcoa and Ale an Aluminiur:1 Ltd; 
built and expanded alumina and aluminiuo plants in the u.s. and Canada to proceaa 
bauxite from the Guianas. Jersey Standard and Shell built huge refineries in 
Aruba and Curacao to process their Venezuelan crude. It is therefore the 
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pattern of locational allocation determined by the needs of the corporate 
economies which is responsible for the considerable underutilization of the 
potential of these industries to serve as "growing points" within the national 
economies. 
It is true that the tariff policies of Metropolitan Governments in 
imposing higher duties on finished goods than on raw materials are partly 
responsible for the firms' location of processing capacity in their home 
countries. But they are by no means a full explanation. Powerful factors 
have operated at the level of the internal economics of the firm. In some 
cases it was cheaper to expand processing plants which had originally been 
based on metropolitan raw materials, to process the materials coming from 
abroad, than to build new plants overseas. Operational economies of scale 
could also be obtained from such a course. Another advantage is that it 
allowed the firms to adjust processing plants to accomodate to the desired 
distribution of raw material production between different sources. Location 
at any one Hinterland source might have committed the £inn to drawing all 
the feed for the plant from that source, thereby precluding "least-cost" 
out of the strategic significanceadjustments over time. Another factor arose 
of these materials during wartime. 'Shipments from Chile and the Caribbean 
were particularly susceptible to submarine attacks during the Second World 
War, and the fear operated during the Korean War as well, By shipping the 
unrefined rather than the refined product the value of the material lost 
from. any sinking was minimized: both the corporations and their home Govern­
ments had an identity of interest on this point. Finally, there was the 
to risk aswell-known factor that the companies preferred (and still prefer) 
little capital as possible in countries where the political order cannot be 
relied upon to regard their existence as sacrosanct. 
The next question concerns the adoption of techniques in these 
industries which are not only capital-intensive relative to the national 
economy at the outset, but frequently become increasingly capital-intensive 
over time. An outstanding example is the Venezuelan and Dutch Antilles oil 
industries, which shed 33 and 70 percent of their labour force respectively 
between 1950 and 1966, although output doubled in the former and remained the 
same in the latter ove~ the same period. The virtually total failure of the 
mineral-export industry to adapt to the relatively labour-abundant, capital­
scarce nature of the Hinterland economies becomes perfectly understandable 
if ·we consider the factor-endowment situation of the corporate economy of 
which each producing unit is an organic part. Capital is relatively plentiful 
and cheap to the multinational corporation; first because of its large use of 
depreciation allowances and retained earnings for new investment,and second 
because it has direct access to the highly developed capital markets of the 
Metropoles. In contrast, the skilled labour needed to operate the machinery 
and equipment in the Hinterland is relatively scarce, and the firms them­
selves often have to bear the costs of training it, Moreover, the technology 
of production embodied in the capital goods which the company must purchase 
for its new investment, has become increasingly capital-intensive in response 
to the increasingly capital-rich nature of Metropolitan economy. The absence 
of an indigenous capital-goods sector in the ~interlands appropriate to the 
factor-endowments there precludes the very availability of production processes 
and capital goods which are relatively more labour-intensive. In summary, 
the price of capital relative to that of labour to the firms does not represent 
the social opportunity cost of using capital relative to labour in the 
costs of using direct foreignHinterland (especially considering the high 
capital); and the same reasons underlying this also mean that a labour-inten­
sive technology is simply not available. 
It is to the structure of the corporation that we must also look for the 
explanation of the failure of the surplus of the mineral-export industry to 
be invested in other sectors of the national economy. The surplus is in 
reality tied to the needs and strategy of the corporation as a whole. Indeed 
as we saw earlier the surplus of the raw material subsidiary is an accounting 
item which has neither a cash nor an operational significance to the sub­
sidiary itself, hence it is simply that part of the firm's total cash surplus 
to the subsidiary for purposes of tax minimization.,-ihich it elects to "impute II 
How much it decides to reinvest there is a different question again: it depends 
on the determined expansion of end product capacity and the determined location 
of new raw material capacity. What is not reinvested in the given raw material 
subsidiary is not available to the national economy but to the corporate 
economy. Hence it is allocated in a manner consistent with the firm's strategy, 
between different raw rnate-:ial subsidiaries, different refineries, fabricators, 
sales and other departmental units, different end-products, and dividends, 
debt reductions and additions to working capital. 
Finally, there is the question of the "reliance" on foreign capital in 
tothe industry, which was discussed earlier in the paper. Suffice it here 
recall that, viewed in its historical perspective, the denationa-liu.tion of the 
oineral industries of the Hinterland was cr.craly the corolarry of the multi­
that the practicesnationalization of the Metropolitan corporations. And further, 
of the corporations make it impossible for national capitalists to restore 
the industries to national ownership. The large fraction of the industry's sales 
value accruing abroad in the form of depreciation and net profits is only one 
of the more visible consequences of this. 
(b) The Mineral Export-Industry and the National Economy: Achievements and 
Frustrations of G,overnment Intervention 
The rules of the game, therefore, mean that the struggle of the Hinter­
land economy for a larger share of the industry's sales - a greater share of 
11 Returned 11 value in total value - is chanelled chiefly through the efforts of 
the labour force, and the national Government. However, there are limits to 
the extent to which the labour force can enlarge its share in the industry's 
value, as distinct from raising wage rates. First, since the labour content 
per unit of physical output in the industry is low, large increases in wage 
rates can be conceded to militant mine workers with relatively small increases 
in labour share - indeed, mechanization can and often does reduce the wage 
content of output even as wage rates increase. (In Venzuela between 1950 and 
1966, labour income per man in the oil industry trebled, but total labour 
income as a share of the value of output fell from 15 to 11 percent because of 
the substitution of capital for labour.) Moreover, the bargaining power of 
labour is frequently weakened by the existence of a large reserve of unemployed 
labour and by deliberately repressive policies of the national Government. 
Indeed, the history of the mineral-export industries in the American 
Hinterland shows that the fact that the wage bill is one of the chief components 
of the national take from the industry is no guarantee of Government's support 
for efforts to increase it. Oilfield workers in Vene,..;uela were forcibly suppressed 
in the 1930s and 1940s, as l1ere Chilean copper workers in the 1940s. For 
- 33 
years i labour unions in the refineries of the Dutch islands faced official 
opposition, and in Trinidad-Tobago the passage of legislation to control 
strikes in 1965 was aimed mainly at the oil workero. The reasons for the 
militancy of the mine ·i:-.1orkers on the one hand, and the frequent hostility of 
the national Governmen= to them on the other hand, arise directly out of the 
nature of the industry. The fact that the workers are well-paid relatively 
to the mass of the labour force, and have relatively skilled tasks to per­
form, give them much greater confidence in their attitude to management by 
comparison to farm workers wha are subject to traditional paternalistic 
relationships. At the same time) the fact that ownersh:i.p and management in 
the industry are foreign, and frequently culturally and racially distinct from 
the national population, sharpens the inherent antagonism between labour and 
capital. Left-wing leadership is therefore frequently quite strong in the 
labour movement in the ind11stry. Faced with the fact or the prospect of the 
emergence of an independent base of power in the
-
political system, a national 
Government unsure of its own popular support inevitably develops an insecur.ity 
complex. Moreover, where the Government and the companies have reached ~n under­
standing on the questions of ta:rntion and the rate of expansion, militant 
labour demands threaten to upset the delicately balanced "partership. 11 Indeed, 
the very existence of a large-scale state apparatus in many cases is.the direct 
creation of the taxes paid by the industry: if militant labour demands threaten 
the rate of expansion of the industry determined by the companies, it threatens 
the rate of expansion of the state apparatus as well. 
But even where bargaining is relatively free the capital-intensity of 
the industry and the possibilities of continuing capital/labour substitution 
limit the possible growth of labour 
1 s share, as has been pointed out. The 
real locus of the struggle to increaze the national "take" from the industry 
inevitably emerges as the distr.ibuticn of the large surplus between the foreign 
company and the nntionsl Government~ Le. between depreciation-cum-net profits 
on the one hand and taxes on the other. 
In some important cases (Venezuela, Chile, Surinam and Jamaica) it is 
possible to distinguish clearly ~n initial period of light and indifferent 
taxation followed by a period of growing tcx rates and attentive regulation 
of the factors governing the taz take. In Venezuela .:.r.d Chile, the first 
period lasted up to the D~press~on ye~rs of the 1930s and was associated with 
the laissez-faire a~tituces of contemporary Governments and a low national 
awareness of the large surpluses accruing to the foreign owners of the industry. 
The Depression years precipitcted a radical change in the degree of state 
intervention in the econo,ny :.:r.d .::i :rap:.td growth of national interest in increas­
ing "Returned Value" by means of tax maasures. In Surinam and Jamaica the 
first period lasted up until the middle 1950s and was due to ignorance of the 
real potential of extracting tayes from the industry_., AG well as the indifference 
and/or hostility of the Dutch and Di:-itish colonial administrations to the 
question. Renegotiation of the tax arrangem~nts ,1as the work of the first 
generation of ne.tional politicians anxious to increase the spending power of 
the embryonic national atate. 
In all the economies concerned~ the growth of the industry or the growth 
of the rate of ta;~ation, or both, rc:.ulted in the 
1:Reture.ed Value" of the 
industry becomir..g '3 majo::- source of foreign ei:chnngc. and .the tax payoents of the 
industry becoming e :.:,;~)or source of Govs;.·nmen't re·,.1enue. Th:i.a development has 
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In the first
a profound significance to the national po
litical eccaomy. 
place, the maintenance and growth of the l
evels of investment, domestic output 
and consumption become structured around t
he imports of capital, intermediate 
and consumption goods financed by the fore
ign exchange provided by the industry's 
In the second place, the maint.enance and g
rowth of the level
"Returned Value. 
11 
of nationa1 income become structurally dep
endent to a significant degree on 
the current and capital expenditure of the
 Government, a large part of which 
Finally, the possibilities for
is financed by the industry's tax payments
. 
structural transformation of the economy c
ome to lie not with the direct 
but rather with the success
effects of the industry on the rest of the
 economy, 
of the Government's economic development p
olicies, which are implemented by 
expenditures whose size and growth become 
criticaily dependent on the industry's 
tax payments. 
We should pause here to note the differen
t nature and degrees of 
structural dependence of the corporate as 
compared to the national economic 
system on the raw material producing subs
idiaries located in the Hinterland 
To the corporate economic systems, the sub
sidiary is one of a
economies. 
number of such subsidiaries located in dif
ferent national economies providing 
the enterprise with the strategic input up
on which rests its global network 
of transport, refining and fabricating fac
ilities, and therefore its level of 
For the national economic system, the subs
idiary is
sales and net profits. 
one of a very small number (sometimes the 
only one) which provides it indirectly 
with a large part of its strategic commod
ity inputs, its level of nggrGgatc 
expenditure and therefore income, and the 
possibilities of its structural trans­
formation. 
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The dependence of the two systems on the subsidiary is inherently 
asymmetrical: i.e. the national economy is more dependent on the subsidiary than 
is the multinational corporation, in spite of (indeed, perhaps because of) the 
fact that the subsidiary is an institutional part of the latter economy and 
not of the former, The reasons are as follows, First, most companies draw 
their raw materials from a number of different gee-political supply sources, 
and negotiate with the political authorities of each one separately. The 
country however depends on one or at best a small number of subsidiaries and, 
what is more important, the inherently non-discriminatory nature of Government 
mining and tax legislation means that the Government negotiates with the mineral 
industry as a collective whole, irrespective of the number of subsidiaries 
in it. Second, the profits "imputed" to the raw material subsidiary by the 
parent firm forms only a part of its total profits imputed at different 
stages of production, and the location of the different compsnents of its 
total profits can be shifted from stage to stage and therefore from country 
to country with a large degree of corporate freedom. While it is true that 
there are other sources of tax revenue for the national economy, in all the 
mineral-export national economies,no other single industry has a taxable 
capacity of the size and growth potential of the mineral-export industry. 
It is however, at the level of long-term growth and development that 
For whiletbe asymmetrical nature of the dependence is most clearly shown. 
the strategic planning of the corporation ensures that its continued growth 
does not depend on the life of any one raw material subsidiary or even on any 
one product, the attempts of the Governments to do the same thing for the 
national economy have invariably met with limited success. It is to an analysis 
of some of these frustrations that I next turn. 
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Government attempts to use the industry's tax revenues
 to diversify 
the bases of economic growth are basically similar in 
strategy in all the 
economies. although the details of policy and programm
es do vary from case 
The basic strategy is to use Government expenditure and
 policy to
to case. 
try to raise output and initiate new activities in the
 agricultural and 
The targets are to substitute domestic output formanufacturing sectors. 
imports in a considerable range of agricultu~al and ma
nufactured goods, and 
The objective is that these twoeventually to develop new export lines. 
key sectors will develop a momentum of growth which ca
n be internally 
sustained and thereby reduce the economy's dependence 
on the mineral-export 
The overall social goals are of course, the elimination
 of
industry. 
structural unemployment and the raising of the level o
f material welfare of 
the mass of the population. 
This strategy involves the Government in heavy infrast
ructural 
expenditures designed to support and to stimulate priv
ate capital investment 
in the required areas, and to help provide bouyant mar
kets for domestic output 
The main areas of spending are in such over­by stimulating internal demand. 
head facilities as roads and highways, ports, harbours
 and railways, power 
These are sometimes supplemented byand communications, and mass education. 
a large public buildings programme rationalized by the
 need for employment and 
income creation, but also used to provide the image of
 "modernity" judged 
necessary to attract foreign investment and to service
 the aspirations of 
the polLtical establishment to Metropolitan life-styles
. 
This strategy has been followed i.n its essence since W
orld War 11 by 
virtually all Hinterland countries which have not opte
d for socialist central 
planning, and to discuss the reasons for their failure
 to solve any of the 
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fundamental problems of Hinterland economies is obviously beyond the scope 
of this paper. Attention here is focussed on some of the frustrations of 
applying the strategy in the particular conditions of mineral-export economies, 
and which arise in spite of the fact that the mineral industries often give 
these Governments large and growing revenues with which to finance the strategy. 
One set of frustrations arise of certain external diseconomies of the 
mineral industry in relation to agriculture and forestry. In the first 
place, the supply of land and of labour to the agricultural sector may be 
adversely affected. Both the alumin:ill~and the oil companies are in the habit 
of holding large areas of the national territory with proven or probable 
reserves of the desired material. The objectives are of course to maximize 
the long-term availability of raw materials to the parent firm and to 
minimize its availability to competitors, objectives which frequently give 
rise to holdings far in excess of what is used by the firm over a long 
period of time. Such holdings significantly reduce the actual or potential 
national acreage which is held or used principally for purposed of agriculture 
and forestry. This also extends to the use of associated natural resources 
&Ht4h as water and local building materials. 
The effect of the industry in reducing the supply of agricultural 
labour is one of its better-known external diseconomies. The relatively high 
wages paid by the companies and the quasi-urban areas established by them for 
extractive and administrative activities attract a heavy migration from the 
asricultural areas. In addition, when the Government begins large-scale 
expenditure programmes the capital city usually absorbs a dispropo~tionately 
large share of expenditures, and this acts as a magnet to rural labour as well. 
The result is that labour for the traditional low-productivity, low-income 
agricultural activities becomes in inc~easingly short supply at the going 
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wage rate on the plantations and haciendas, and at the going level of average 
real income on the minifundia. Farm workers and the younger members of the 
farm family prefer to seek employment in the mining areas and in the capital 
city, or simply prefer to be unemployed, rather than work for what are now 
considered to be unconscionably low returns. To bring about some degree of 
rationality in the structure of wages and incomes would require (a) land reform 
and technical change in the agricultural sector, and (b} the institutional 
Both requireintegration of the mineral industry with the national economy. 
fundamental institutional changes which are not possible without political 
changes as_ well. 
The mineral industry also indirectly affects the pattern of commodity 
demand for agricultural products. The small group of well-paid mine workers 
and the growing group of relatively well-paid public sector employees give 
rise to patterns of food consumption in which the simple starchy staples 
traditionally produced by peasant farmers become progressively less important, 
33
d experience. 1ow, f a 11 · · · 
1 t · · t · Agriculturalan 1ng or even negative 1ncome-e~as 1c1 1es. 
products with a higher and more balanced nutritional content, such as high­
protein foods, meat and dairy products; and products associated with Metropolitan 
urban and suburban life-styles, such as processed and pre-cooked foods, are 
amongst those with high income-elasticities. The initiation of activities to 
satisfy these demands is beyond the capacity of the traditional agricultural 
sector, especially peasant agriculture, acting by itself. They involve not 
only quantitative and qualitative changes in the supply of inputs to the sector, 
but also complementary investments in transport, storage and distribution 
facilities, and complementary marketing policies. 
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A second set of frustrations arise out of the external diseconomies 
of the mineral industry to the manufacturing sector. In the first place, 
the most immediate and obvious possibilities for the establishment of a 
dynamic manufacturing industry lies in most cases precisely with the mineral 
industry itself; i.e. in creating a whole network of backward and forward 
linkages centered on the processes and products of the industry, which would 
eventually grow to acquire a dynamic of its mm. This means initiating the 
production of capital and intermediate goods,supplying the needs of and 
using the products of the industry, and carrying its vertieal integration within 
the national economy forward to the production of final goods where possible. 
It is precisely these possibilities which are to a large extent pre-
cluded by the vertically integrated structure of the corporation. The standard­
ization of processes and products and the minimization of costs required by 
the corporate economic system mean that the purchase of all important supplies 
is centralized at the Purchasing Department on its equivalent in the Metropole, 
and almost certainly obtained from Metropolitan suppliers; the gearing of 
raw material capacity in the Hinterland to processing capacity in the Metropole 
means that Hinterland output is not free to be processed locally. In other 
words the possibilities of utilizing the resource as a basis of backward and 
forward linkages within the national economy is restricted by its already 
existing use as a basis of backward and forward linkages withing the corporate 
34 
economy. 
There are also diseconomies which, like those which apply to the 
agricultural sector, arise out of the effect of the industry on the structure 
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of wage rates amd of consuncr dcoand throughout the cconony. The relatively 
high wage rates in the mineral industry tend to set the pattern of wage 
rates throughout the economy, especially in manufacturing where an occupation­
by-occupation comparison witb the mine workers is often possible. Wage rates 
in the mineral industry display a persistent tendency to rise, as the mine 
workers compare their wage scales with those. of metropolitan workers in the 
same industry and with their own rising average productivity, due to capital/ 
labour substitution. This exerts a continual upward pressure on wage-rates 
in manufacturing. where the capital/labour ratios, and therefore average 
labour productivity, is lower, and the weight of wages in total production 
costs higher. 
TWo adverse results can be immediately seen to follow from this. One 
is that the consequently high structure of production costs in the sector 
severely weakens its ability to successfully compete with imports, and achieve 
the overall objective of substantial import-substitution which is self-sustaining. 
The second is that the structure of high labour costs in particular encourages 
the tendency for capital/labour subsitution already inherent in the dependence 
of Hinterland economies on Metropolitan technology and corporations. This 
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severely dampens the employment-creating capacity of the sector. capital-
intensity also makes it more difficult for manufacturing plants to achieve low 
operational costs on the basis of the domestic market alone. 
The effects of the industry in creating enclaves of high-income mining 
and Government employees also biases the structure of demand for manufactures 
in the direction of relatively expensive consumer durables such as motor-cars 
and household equipment. These are precisely the kinds of goods which it is 
most difficult for indigenous enterprise using indigenous technology and 
•· L; 7 -
indigenous inputs, to undertake in the early stages of its developraent. This 
is all the norc so 3iven the tieing of consumption to particular brand-naocs 
such as Kclvinator and Chevrolet - which the r.1Ultinational nanufacturing 
c oopanics have popularized oultinationally. Indeed, this applies even to 
the sioplcr nanufactures such as ::;oft-drinks (e.g. Coca-Cola) and cigarettes 
(e.g. Chesterfield). Hhat therefore encr:;es by the name of nanufacturing 
industry is a :::c.t of 11tariff-hopin3 11 a::;scnbly-plants established by oetropolitan 
coopanics and based on their capital, intcrnediatc 3oods and technolor;y. 
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Thone di[icicnccs in the structure and the pcrfornancc of the agricultural 
and nanufacturin::; sectors arc noreover allo\vcd to persist for sonc tir.1c without 
beconing a serious problen to the political cconony, precisely because of the 
abundance of forcir;n c:;:changc provided o:r the nineral industry itself. Ioport of 
food arc readily available to fill in the :;ap between food dcr:iand and local food 
supplies, inports of capital cquipr:ient and intcrncdiatc goods arc available to 
service the dependent character of the nanufacturin3 sector, and inports of 
finished consur:icrs r;oods arc available to r.1cct the dor.icstic dcr.1ands that dor.iestic 
nanufacturinr; fails to □cet. Hor cover, the boon in inport::i and in public 
spendinr:; do r;ive ri::ie to certain investr.1cnt opportunities within which national 
capital can find secure, quick and hic;h returns. These arc the activities of 
inport tradin[;, and its ancillary activity, internal transport; the promotion 
and construction of office buildings and residential accomodation, public 
work contract business, and personal and conncrcial services. The oost io-
portant of thcnc activities arc those which arc c.entcrcd on physical construction, 
as an inspection of the National .Accounts of Venezuela, Chile, Trinidad-Tobago or 
Jauaica, o:r a visit to Caracas, Santiazo, Port~of-Spain o:.: Kinz::iton, Hill readily 
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The overall result is that ~ost important structural changes taking 
place in association with the growth of the level of foreign exchange and 
tax revenue provided by the industry,are those which assume the continued 
existence of these flows. In terms of the country's external accounts, this 
is reflected in the continued weight of the mineral export in total exports, 
and the rapid growth of imports both of final consumer goods and of intermediate 
goods for local assembly. In terms of the national accounts, it is reflected 
in the weight of the mining, Government and service sectors in the Gross Domestic 
Product by Industrial Origin. In terms of the demand components, it is 
reflected in the importance of exports, foreign investment in the mineral 
industry, and Government expenditure on current and capital account. Long-
term growth is governed by the rate of expansion of the mineral-export industry. 
Structural dependence, rather than being reduced, has in an important sense 
been intensified by the partial incorporation of the industry into the national 
economy Y!!_ the public sector. 
So long as output in the mineral-export industry grows steadily and 
prices on which taxes are based remain firm, this system is capable of continued 
expansion along the lines of what we might call "dependent growth without 
development." There will be high investment rates, and a relatively high rate 
of growth of total and average per capita national income, although structural 
poverty and unemployment remain widespread. But as we have seen the mineral­
export industry does not expand indefinitely: the very factors which make it 
important to the national economy - the high rate of growth of output and 
the growth of the tax take - are those which make it necessary for the company 
or companies ultimately to shift the location of new capacity elsewhere. The 
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consequent reduction in the rate of growth of output is directly reflected 
in the decline in the growth of tax revenue and foreign exchange receipts. This 
puts pressure on the most important propulsive mechanism of the system - the 
growth of public spending - and the most important permissive mechanism - the 
growth of imports. Hence the political economy will either have to contain 
these mechanisms, or to find ways and means of allowing them continued operation. 
It will not be easy for these mechanisms to be contained, precisely 
because they becoine intrinsic parts of the political economy itself. The momentum 
of public spending is difficult to control because of both real and monetary 
factors. The real level of recurrent spending has to rise steadily because of the 
recurrent costs of servicing the steadily growing stock of public assets, such 
as schools, hospitals, roads and public buildings. Powerful political pressures 
exist for the maintenance and growth of capital spending as well, for neglected 
socio-economic and geographic groups, whose expectations have been aroused, 
make their demands for their share of Government services. The growth of 
population adds yet another factor which public spending has to account for. 
Finally, the steady growth of wage rates consequent on the internal demonstration 
effect of the mine workers adds an important inflationary factor to public 
spending. Obviously,a political establishment which exists because of its 
ability to accomodate to such demands will find it very difficult to contain them. 
Neither will it be easy to contain the growth of imports without severe 
effects on the economy and therefore severe costs to the polity. It is precisely 
the growth of imports which permits the propulsive mechanism to operate without 
37· f d . ' . fl .entai1ing severe costs 1.n terms o . omest1.c price 1.n at1.on. Imports also 
sustain the level and growth of output in the fledgeling manufacturing secto~ 
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by providing intermediate goods; and sustain the level and growth of 
activity in the internal trade and transport sectors. Hence there is a 
limit to the degree to which imports can be restricted without jeopardizing 
output, employment and incomes in domestic manufacturing and import-based 
services, and internal price stability. 
Thus while some degree of internal containment may be attempted, the 
Government is likely to seek ways and means of obtaining additional fiscal 
receipts in the form of foreign exchange, in order to allow both public spend-
ing and imports to continue to grow. The two principal forms potentially 
available are foreign public borrowing and additional taxes on the mineral-
export industry. Ironically, the very existence of the mineral-export industry 
makes it easier for the Government to accumulate heavy foreign indebtedness, 
since its external credit-worthiness is good. This is probably one reason why 
Governments such as those of Venezuela, Chile and Jamaica, which are relatively 
well off in Hinterland America, have experience a rapid growth of their external 
public debt in the last two decades. However this method is at best at 
temporary solution: foreign loans are not available indefinitely at a steadily 
high rate of growth in the absolute level, and in any case they create obligations 
which grow proportionately to their use. Hence the Government finds itself 
with the need to try to .extract even greater surpluses from the mineral-export 
industry. 
Essentially, this was the position in which Chile found itself at the 
beginning of the 1950 decade, and Venezuela at the beginning of the 1960 decade. 
Their subsequent experienceSshow that there is a limit to which a Government 
already taxing the mineral-export industry relatively heavily (say, at over 50 
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percent of net profits) can further increase its take of profits without 
coming into open conflict with the corporate economic system. For the 
attempt to increase revenues leads inevitably to the more basic questions 
of control over production, accounting, pricing and marketing, since the 
variables determining the very size of the net profits to which the tax rate 
is being applied, are to a large extent under the control of the corporation 
itself. In the first place, the company starts out with considerable leeway 
over the size of the depreciation, depletion, and amorization allowances 
which it deducts from its income in declaring taxable profit. For example, 
whether exploration and development expenditures are capitalized or treated 
as operational costs, what rate of depreciation or depletion will be used, whether 
and what kind of investment and depletion allowances will apply. Second, the 
company begins with almost total control over the price used to value the 
product, which is essentially an intra-firm accounting item used for tax­
minimization purposes. The Government eventually discovers that apparently 
minor changes in accounting procedures and prices can make as big a difference 
in its tax take as relatively large changes in the percentage rate of tax on 
profits. 
The inevitable logic of this is that the Government must assert its 
right to participate in those decisions which determine its tax take: accounting, 
pricing and marketing. It is not difficult to see that, apart from reducing 
profits, such moves go against the grain of the corporate system itself: its 
routines, its reflexes, its administrative structure, its decision-making 
procedures - the rules of the game, as· it were. While most companies appear 
to have accomodated without great difficulty to these encroachments on their 
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authority~ pa~t of their response is to utilize alternative supply sources 
as a ocans to pressure the governncnts and of obtaining new supplies on rel­
atively free terr.is. The counter-respon::ie of the Governoents is necessarily 
to reduce the cor.1pr1nics' area of ::ianeuverability by international collective 
bargainin:3, i.e. airnociations of producinr; countries. This was to a large ex­
tent responsible for the leading role played by Venezuela and Chile respectively 
in the forr.mtion of the associations of oil and copper-exporting countries,· 
It is not difficult to sec that a further logical counter-thrust of 
the national cconouic systen is full national ownership and control over the 
nineral-c::icport industry. This dcvelopnent is already l1ell under l1ay in these 
two countries, with the forr:iation of the national oil coo.pany in Venezuela 
and the "Chilenization 11 arranger:ients for copper r:iade by the Frei Governncnt. 
The logic of this analysis is that the rJonentun of nationalization of 
pricing, nar:~ctinr;, ownc:rship and dccision-r:ialdng r:iay in fact represent the 
dcnand of the nationnl econonic systen to continue along the sane c::pansion 
path as before ncrely by brcal::in:3 tf1c constraints on the continued 
growth of its fiscal and forci2;n e}:chan3c receipts represented by the 
structure and policies of the uultinational corporation. 
The diversification of the bases of econonic growth, and the clio.ination 
of structural uneo.ployr.ient and of natcrial poverty, would not take place without 
conpler.icntary inotitutional chanecs and con.plencntary policies ,-,ith respect to 
agriculture, the financial systen, the r:ianufacturing sector and the educational 
systen. llithout such conpler.ientary chan3cs, it is quite easy to envisage an 
cconony which renaino structurally dependent on its nationalized r.tlneral-
e,cport indui::try, in the sense that the structure, .level nnd rate of c;rowth of 
national incor;ie arc dependent on the pe:rfor,.1ancc of the industry. Hhat will 
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have changed howeve~ are the institutional ties which made investment, pro­
duction, processing and prices in the industry subject to the needs of a 
global enterprise. Which is to sny that whereas nationalization is not a 
sufficient condition -£or the elimination of the structural dependence of the 
national economic _system on the industry, it is certair.ly a necessary one. 
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34H · a c1ear exarnp 1e o f _ e c1ash be t ween the perspectives andere 1s +-h 
structure of the multinational firm and the national economy inherent in the 
distinction made by Hymer: "Multinational corporations are private institutions 
which organize one or a few industries across many countries. Its polar opposite 
(the anti-multinational corporation perhaps) is a public institution which 
organizes many industries across one region." From his ''Multinational Corpor­
ations and the Law of Uneven Development" cited. 
35 see Dudley Seers, "Open Petroleum Economy" op, cit. 
36Some aspects of this are treated by Havelock Brewster and Clive Thomas, 
The Dynamics of West Indian Economic Integration, Jamaica, 1967; Norman Girvan 
and Owen J'efferson, "Corporate vs. Caribbean Integration" New World Quarterly, 
Jamaica, 1968; and Osvaldo Sunkel, "Latin American Underdevelopment in the 
Year 2000" Forthcoming. 
37The Chilean inflation appears to have been caused in part by a failure 
to contain precisely those mechanisms. See Osvaldo Sunkel, "Inflation in 
Chile: An Unorthodox View" in International Economic Pape!!,, No. 10. 
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